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Abstract 
 
Corporate site visit is an important type of investors’ information acquisition activities, but its 
usefulness is not well understood in the literature, partially due to the lack of data. Using a 
unique dataset of corporate site visits in China, we analyze the information content and the 
determinants of corporate site visits. Our main findings are as follows. First, we document a 
significant market reaction to corporate site visits and the market reaction is stronger for group 
visits, for visits conducted by mutual fund managers, for visits covering firm-specific topics, and 
for firms with poorer information environment. Second, we find that stock returns around site 
visits are positively associated with forthcoming earnings news, suggesting that corporate site 
visits enable investors to obtain information predictive of future earnings. Lastly, consistent with 
the cost and benefit of conducting site visits, investors are more likely to conduct site visits to 
profitable firms, firms with more business segments, firms with a higher market share, and firms 
located closer to economic centers. Additional tests indicate that site visits represent selective 
access events, not selective disclosure events. Overall, our study contributes to the literature by 
presenting the first systematic evidence on the information role of corporate site visits.  
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1. Introduction 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) bans managers’ selective disclosure of material 
nonpublic information (thereafter referred to as selective disclosure) with the intent to level the 
playing field for investors. As a result, investors have to rely on other forms of information 
acquisition activities. One increasingly popular form is selective access, which is allowed under 
Reg. FD. Selective access is defined as the opportunity for investors to meet privately with 
managers in individual or small group settings (Bushee et al. 2011a). However, despite its 
importance, there is limited evidence regarding the capital market consequences of selective 
access, especially corporate site visits. The lack of research in this area is primarily due to the 
lack of data on private information acquisition activities (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). In this 
study we use a unique dataset to examine the information role of corporate site visits, whereby 
site visits refer to investors visiting corporate headquarters or manufacturing facilities and 
meeting with mid-level managers. Specifically, we investigate whether investors’ corporate site 
visits are informative events and if so, whether site visits convey any information about future 
earnings. To better understand the cost and benefit of conducting corporate site visits, we further 
analyze the determinants of the occurrence and the frequency of site visits.   
Investors are likely to gain new, credible information about a firm’s performance through 
site visits because they are able to view its fixed assets, to look over inventory warehouses, to 
observe its operating and R&D activities, and to talk to middle- or low-level employees. The 
obtained information is credible because it is difficult for the firm to hide or fake real corporate 
activities and real assets. As indicated in the 2012 All-Europe Research Survey, site visit is an 
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important type of information acquisition activities.1 This indicates that the credible information 
obtained from site visits can trigger stock price movement when visitors and their clients trade 
on the information.2 On the other hand, site visits might be corporate events for public relation or 
entertainment and hence do not convey any useful information to the visitors. In addition, during 
the site visits the visitors usually do not meet with top managers, and if the top managers are the 
only reliable source of information, visitors will not gain useful information. Thus, whether 
investors are able to obtain information from site visits is an empirical question.  
While data on corporate site visits are not publically available in the U.S. (Soltes 2012), 
they are available in China. Starting from 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) required 
companies to disclose every site visit in annual reports. We hand collect site visit records from 
annual reports of all Shenzhen-listed companies.3 Our dataset consists of 12,326 site visits to 579 
firms from 2009 to 2011. For each site visit, we collect the date, visitors’ names, location, and 
the discussed topics. In addition, we identify the number and types of visiting institutions for 
each site visit, so that we can investigate whether the market reaction to corporate site visits 
varies with the characteristics of visitors.  
Overall, we find significant market reactions around the three-day window centered on site 
visits. The absolute abnormal return is on average 7.30% higher, and the abnormal trading 
                                                 
1 This survey shows that among the twelve types of popular information acquisition activities, investors rank 
corporate site visits (ranking: No.6) higher than one-on-one meetings with the management (No.7), analysts’ written 
reports (No.8), and analysts’ earnings estimates (No.12).  
2 It is important to note that not only visitors can trade on the information obtained from site visits, visitors’ clients 
and other individuals who get to know the information obtained from site visits through the so-called “expert 
network” may also trade on the information obtained from site visits. However, only knowing the occurrence of site 
visits is unlikely to lead to trading because visitors may uncover either good news or bad news. Thus, the stock price 
movement in the short window around site visits reflects the information content of corporate site visits and is not 
driven by the occurrence of site visit events, which is not publically available until the firm files annual reports. 
3 There are two stock exchanges in China: Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) oversees capital market activities in China and 
delegates authority for disclosure regulations to the stock exchanges. While the SZSE mandates all firms to publicly 
disclose information related to site visits in annual reports, the SHSE does not have such requirement.  
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volume is 8.25% higher, than that in the normal period.4 We then investigate whether the market 
reaction to site visits varies with the characteristics of visited firms and site visits. Consistent 
with the notion that the marginal benefit of information acquisition activities is higher for firms 
with poor information environment, we find that the market reaction to site visits is stronger for 
firms covered with fewer analyst coverage and lower mandatory disclosure quality. As for the 
characteristics of site visits, we find that the market reaction is stronger for site visits conducted 
by a larger group of visitors, for site visits conducted by mutual funds, and for site visits 
covering firm-specific topics, than other site visits.  
Next we investigate whether the information visitors obtained from corporate site visits is 
related to firms’ future earnings. This investigation is important in its own right and it also helps 
us to examine the alternative explanation that the documented market reaction is due to visitors’ 
noise trading or their misinterpretation of the information obtained during the site visits. If 
visitors obtain useful information regarding earnings and convey such information through 
trading, we conjecture that the (signed) stock returns around site visits are associated with 
forthcoming earnings surprises. Calculating earnings surprises as the difference between actual 
earnings and the consensus analyst earnings forecast prior to the site visits, we find that the 
abnormal stock returns around site visits are positively correlated with future earnings surprises. 
The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings news based on the prior year’s earnings. 
These results imply that investors obtain credible earnings information during site visits. This 
inference is also strengthened by a lack of stock price reversal in a period after site visits.5  
The role of corporate site visits in conveying information to the capital market could result 
                                                 
4 In comparison, Bushee et al. (2011b) find that the increase in absolute abnormal returns is roughly 9% of the mean 
value in the normal period for conference call presentation.  
5 We observe a stock price drift after the site visits through which visitors obtain bad news. This drift is likely due to 
the short-selling constraint in China.  
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from two possible information channels: selective access or selective disclosure. While the 
former refers to investors searching for mosaic information through observing the firm’s 
activities, the latter refers to firms’ managers providing private information to select investors. 
Although Reg. FD bans selective disclosure, it might occur during the in-house meetings and 
hence drive the documented results. To distinguish between these two information channels, we 
identify site visits conducted within 30 days prior to earnings announcements. If it is selective 
disclosure that drives the results, the results should be stronger for these site visits than for others 
as the demand for information and the chance for selective disclosure are the highest in this 
period. In contrast, selective access does not lead to this prediction. One can even argue that the 
information content of site visits is even lower in this period because managers are concerned 
with the risk of selective disclosure. Consistent with site visits being selective access events, we 
find no evidence of a stronger market reaction or a stronger return-earnings association for site 
visits occurred in the month before earnings announcements. In fact, the results indicate that the 
market reaction is smaller for these pre-earnings-announcements site visits than other site visits. 
These findings indicate that it is the information acquisition, not the selective disclosure, that 
drives the information role of site visits in the capital market.  
Given the benefit of site visits, it is natural for one to ask why investors do not conduct site 
visits to all firms. To shed light on this issue, we investigate investors’ decision to conduct 
corporate site visits. We hypothesize that the likelihood and frequency of site visits are higher 
when the perceived benefit is high and the cost is low. Consistent with our prediction, we find 
that the likelihood and the frequency of site visits are positively associated with common proxies 
for the demand for and the benefit of information: past earnings performance, the number of 
business segments, firm size, analyst coverage, and market share. On the cost side, we find that 
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the likelihood and the frequency of site visits are negatively associated with the distance between 
corporate headquarters and economic centers, a proxy for information acquisition costs. These 
results provide evidence consistent with the cost-benefit trade-off in the investors’ decision to 
conduct corporate site visits. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following important ways. First, ours is the 
first comprehensive study that examines the information role of investors’ corporate site visits. 
Our results indicate that corporate site visits, an important type of investors’ information 
acquisition activities, play a critical information role in the capital market.  
This study is related to several concurrent studies that examine other forms of selective 
access: one-on-one meetings with CEOs during investor conferences (Bushee et al. 2011a), 
analyst/investor days (Kirk and Markov 2012), and executives’ private jet flights to money 
centers (Bushee et al. 2012). Our paper complements these studies by examining a unique type 
of selective access event: investors’ corporate site visits. While Solomon and Soltes (2011) also 
examine site visits, their sample includes site visits to only one NYSE firm. In contrast, we use a 
large sample of site visits, which enables us to examine issues that Solomon and Soltes cannot 
study, such as the cross-sectional variation in the market reaction to site visits and the 
determinants of site visits. Also, based on a larger sample, our results are naturally more 
generalizable. Although institutional differences exist between China and the U.S. markets, 
China adopts the U.S. version of Reg. FD,6 and similar to their U.S. counterparts, managers in 
                                                 
6 As in the U.S., in China if an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons, the 
issuer has to disclose such information publically. According to Article 41 of the CSRC’s Reg. FD, which was 
effective on January 31, 2007, “A listed company shall, holding conference calls, analysts’ meetings, road shows, 
accepting investors’ field investigation, etc., communicate with the institutions and individuals in respect of the 
business operations, financial status and other events, but it shall not provide any inside information.”  The SZSE 
publicly denounces companies which selectively disclose non-public material information to select institutional 
investors. Such penalty leads to significantly negative market reactions, reduced access to bank loans, higher loan 
spreads, higher likelihood of receiving qualified audit opinions, and higher audit fees (Yang and Xie 2008; Zhu and 
Wu 2009; Chen at al. 2011). 
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Chinese companies are forbidden to provide private information during corporate site visits. As 
such, we believe that our results are generalizable to the U.S. capital markets. Of course, our 
finding in the China context is important in its own right because our sample covers all listed 
firms on the SZSE and China is increasingly important for the world economy.  
Second, our results should be of interest to the regulators. Bushee et al. (2011a) find 
significant increases in trade volume after managers’ presentations at investor conferences, but 
the results hold only when the CEO is present. Their results raise a question of whether granting 
select investors with opportunities to meet with CEOs privately could lead to the leakage of 
material information (Enrich and Cimilluca 2011). Unlike private meetings with CEOs, 
corporate site visits usually do not include meetings with top managers. Therefore, our study 
complements Bushee et al. (2011a) by providing evidence on the information acquisition 
function of selective access activities. At the minimum, our study suggests that at least some 
selective access activities, such as corporate site visits, facilitate investors’ information 
discovery.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background, summarizes related studies, and outlines the research questions. Section 3 describes 
the sample and data. Section 4 presents the market reaction analysis of site visits and Section 5 
reports the analysis of site visits conveying future earnings news. Section 6 presents analyses to 
dispute the possibility that site visits are selective disclosure events. Section 7 examines the 
determinants of investors’ site visits. Section 8 concludes.  
  
2. Institutional background and research questions 
2.1 Reg. FD and the policy debate on selective access 
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Reg. FD prohibits executives from disclosing material nonpublic information to select 
market professionals or institutional investors. Reg. FD was implemented to address the public 
concern that managers provide material information to select investors, who can then trade on 
the information at the expense of less informed investors. In general, prior research finds that 
Reg. FD results in a richer public information environment (e.g., Heflin et al. 2003; Bailey et al. 
2003) and less informative analyst reports (e.g., Irani and Karamanou 2003; Gintschel and 
Markov 2004; Mohanram and Sunder 2006).  
In the post-Reg. FD period, institutional investors can still talk to managers in private 
meetings (Brennan and Tamarowski 2000; Hong and Huang 2005), as long as there is no 
selective disclosure involved. The opportunity for certain investors to meet privately with 
managers or observe corporate operations in individual or small group settings is referred to as 
selective access (Bushee et al. 2011a). There are four types of selective access events (Maber et 
al. 2011):  
(1) investor conferences, which are invitation-only, sector-oriented conferences that are 
oftentimes held in luxury hotels; in these conferences investors can talk to executives 
in one-on-one meetings or break-out sessions (Bushee et al. 2011a, Green et al. 
2013); 
(2) non-deal road shows, which are one-on-one meetings between corporate executives 
and institutional investors, usually in major money-centers (Bushee et al. 2012); 
(3) corporate site visits, which refer to company tours; during site visits institutional 
investors visit firms’ headquarters, production and distribution facilities (Abramowitz 
2006; Jackson 2009; Solomon and Soltes 2011); and 
(4) other face-to-face access events, including informal gatherings such as retreats (e.g., 
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fishing or golfing trips) and meetings at major sporting events (e.g., box seats at a 
Yankees’ game).  
The SEC Round Table Discussion on Reg. FD (2001) indicates that in post-Reg. FD 
period, 27 percent of surveyed lawyers believe that most of their corporate clients have 
conducted one-on-one meetings with analysts. If a firm’s managers directly convey to select 
investors some private information that can be directly traded on, such as the forthcoming EPS 
number, it would be an event of selective disclosure and will be in violation of Reg. FD. In 
contrast, in a typical selective access event, managers provide their opinions or comments on the 
general business operating environment, such as market demands or the development tendency 
of the industry, without giving a directional guidance on firms’ future performance. To benefit 
from managers’ comments, investors need to be familiar with this firm’s operations, as if 
managers’ comments just offer the missing piece of the puzzle. In other words, the information 
obtained from a selective access event is expected to be useful to form a trading strategy only 
when the investors are equipped with enough knowledge about this firm and this information is 
less valuable to those investors who did not collect information beforehand.  
There is currently a debate on whether or not to allow selective access events, especially 
one-on-one meetings. The opponents of selective access argue that selective access sometimes 
veers into discussions involving potentially privileged information that benefits an elite group of 
investors and hence violates Reg. FD. Consistent with the concern of selective disclosure, a 
recent Wall Street Journal article describes how sensitive information of the Ensco-Pride deal is 
leaked during an allegedly legitimate investor meeting, causing a 1% change in the stock price in 
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the hours after the business luncheon at the meeting (Enrich and Cimilluca 2011).7 The article 
also mentions that SEC “recently warned some banks … to be careful that such meetings do not 
result in the improper exchange of privileged information.” On the other hand, the proponents of 
selective access argue that contacting salespeople or going further down in the organization is 
mosaic analysis and should be legitimate, because Reg. FD does not intend to reduce the quantity 
and quality of the information available to investors (SEC 2001). If selective access is an 
important information channel through which investors do their research and collect information, 
then the regulators should not put more obstacles to block the information acquisition efforts of 
financial intermediaries and professional investors. As long as the management does not disclose 
material nonpublic information, the SEC should allow this type of interaction between 
companies and investors (Bushee et al. 2012). Overall, this policy debate indicates the 
importance of understanding the information role of selective access and the channel through 
which investors obtain information during the selective access events (i.e., investors’ information 
discovery or managers’ selective disclosure of private information).  
Although selective access events are allowed in the post-Reg. FD period, U.S. companies 
are not required to disclose information related to such events. The lack of data is the major 
challenge for studies of selective access in the U.S. capital market. From time to time, some 
investors or companies might voluntarily disclose information about the events, which is used in 
some studies, and using voluntarily disclosed selective access events can be subject to a self-
selection issue.8 There is no data on corporate site visits in the U.S. either. In contrast, the 
                                                 
7 In a survey of investors and analysts conducted in 2011, 47% of the respondents say they intentionally or 
unintentionally receive “material” information in one-on-one meetings with corporate executives (RSM Global 
Analyst and Investor Survey 2011). Note that in one-on-one site visits, visitors do not meet with top managers. 
8 For example, studies of analyst-sponsored conference presentations (Bushee et al. 2011a, 2011b; Green et al. 2013) 
rely on Thomson Reuters’s or Bloomberg’s dataset of conference information provided by sponsors and presenting 
companies. Bushee et al. (2012) obtain corporate private jet data from the Wall Street Journal Jet Tracker database. 
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mandatory disclosure of investors’ corporate site visits in China, as described in Section 3, offers 
us with an ideal setting to examine various important issues related to site visits. Equally 
important, unlike other selective access events, top managers are not involved in the site visits 
and the concern with selective disclosure is to a large extent alleviated. 
We would like to note that the China setting is similar to the U.S. setting in that China 
prohibits managers from disclosing private information to select investors. Specifically, on 
January 30, 2007, the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) issued a disclosure 
regulation that explicitly prohibits the leakage of inside information in private meetings or during 
conference calls, road shows, investors’ site visits and other events. Violation of this disclosure 
rule would lead to enforcement actions.9 Similar to the U.S. setting, while selective disclosure is 
banned, companies are allowed to grant investors with selective access through investors’ 
corporate site visits. Therefore, we believe that the insights from our analyses are applicable to 
the U.S. capital markets.  
2.2 The information role of site visits 
A corporate site visit is generally initiated by investors. Site visits also require the 
cooperation from the firm. It is important to note that a firm generally cannot deny visit requests, 
as long as investors file timely applications and sign an agreement to follow the firm’s site visit 
policy, because denying site visit applications might send a negative signal to the capital market. 
Firms can discuss with potential visitors about the timing of corporate site visits. As a result, 
investors might visit the firm alone or with other investors.   
Site visits are costly for investors because they need to pay the related expenses, spend time 
visiting the firm, and execute efforts in collecting information. Without the expected benefit of 
                                                 
9 In particular, the SZSE publicly denounces the companies that selectively disclose private information during site 
visits. In addition, the SZSE also publicly denounces and the companies that fail to properly register with the SZSE 
about their site visits.  
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obtaining information, investors will be unlikely to undertake such costly activities. By visiting 
the firm, investors can get first-hand updated information about the firm’s operations and 
manufacturing activities. The investors can combine the information obtained from the site visit 
with their own private information set to generate useful, tradable information.10  
On the other hand, site visits might not provide visitors with information cues. It is possible 
that site visits are public relation events. In addition, Bushee et al. (2011a) find that in the setting 
of invitation-only investor conferences, CEOs, not CFOs or lower level managers, are the best 
sources of information. A site visit is usually organized by the investor relationship manager or 
the board secretary and it does not include a meeting with top managers.11 Even under very rare 
circumstances where one or two top managers are present, these top managers have to strictly 
follow the disclosure regulation and cannot provide any material nonpublic information. 
Therefore, whether site visits provide new information is an empirical question.  
2.3 Research questions 
Utilizing the unique data available in China, we explore the following questions related to 
site visits: 
1. Are site visits informative? As discussed above, on one hand, investors spend valuable 
resources and time on site visits. Given the rationality of the investors, there must be 
some benefit from such visits. On the other hand, it is unclear whether companies can 
provide any valuable information given the increasingly litigious environment after the 
Reg. FD. In Section 4, we investigate whether site visits are associated with significant 
                                                 
10 It is possible that through site visits, visitors get confirmation on something they have already known about. 
However, this confirmation is still important because it increases the precision of the signal. The increased precision 
of the information can help the visitors to update their forecasts of firm performance, ultimately leading to trading.  
11 To confirm this, we examine the detailed historical records of site visits that are occasionally available from firms’ 
websites. (A few firms started to provide historical records of some site visits in 2012.) We find that these site visits 
are hosted by Board Secretaries, Representatives for Securities Affairs, Heads of Investor Relations, or function 
managers. These individuals are not regarded as top executives in China. None of these visits involve with top 
executives such as the CEO, CFO, or COO. 
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market reaction, and if so, whether the market reaction varies with the characteristics of 
site visits and firms. 
2. If site visits are associated with significant stock price movements, is such stock price 
movement due to investors’ false belief of obtaining useful information or is it due to 
information related to the firm’s operations? To answer this question, we investigate the 
association between the stock price movements around site visits and the upcoming 
earnings news.  
3. If site visits provide useful information, why don’t investors visit all listed firms? To 
shed light on this issue, we investigate the determinants of site visits by examining 
whether factors that capture the potential benefit and cost of site visits explain 
investors’ decision to visit a specific firm.  
 
3. Sample and data 
Unlike in the U.S., data on site visit recently became available in China. According to the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Information Fair Disclosure Guidelines, effective in August 
2006, firms listed on the SZSE have to report to the China Securities Regulation Committee 
(CSRC) two working days before site visits. After the site visit, the firm has to report the 
summary of the site visit to both the CSRC and the SZSE, although these reports are not 
available to the general public. In 2008, the SZSE implemented a new disclosure rule that 
mandates that all listed firms disclose every site visit in their annual reports starting from 2009. 
Appendix A provides an example of such disclosure. As shown in the annual report of Shenzhen 
MTC Co. in 2011, visitors have field tours to the firm’s headquarters and the operating facilities 
and warehouses. Among the eight site visits in 2011, four of them were held in MTC’s factories 
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or industrial parks.  
We hand-collect the information related to site visits for the period 2009 - 2011 from the 
annual reports of firms listed on the SZSE. Our data include the names of visiting institutions or 
individuals, the event dates and locations, and the main topics of discussions during site visits. 
Within this three-year period, 806 unique firms, representing 67.7% of all firms listed on the 
SZSE, have at least one site visit. 
We obtain data on stock returns, financial performance, firm characteristics and analyst 
forecasts from the CSMAR database. To calculate market reactions to site visits, we further 
require the availability of event dates and the stock return data over a period prior to the event 
dates.12 In addition, we exclude firms in the financial industry and firms with missing value on 
variables used in the multivariate analyses. Furthermore, we delete those site visits that fall 
within the seven-day window around annual or quarterly earnings announcements to avoid the 
impact of confounding events.13 Our final sample consists of 12, 326 site visits from 1,186 firm-
years covering 579 unique firms. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure.  
For the firm-years with at least one site visit, the median number of site visits per year is 
7.0 and the mean is 10.41 (untabulated). As shown in Panel B of Table 1, the total number of site 
visits increases from 3,370 in 2009 to 4,419 in 2010, and then to 4,537 in 2011. Panel B of Table 
1 also presents the distribution of the timing of these site visits over the calendar months. There 
is no obvious clustering, except that there are slightly more site visits in November (11.54% of 
all site visits), May (10.71%), and March (9.85%).  
                                                 
12 As described later, we need stock return data for an extended period preceding the event date, including a period 
of 210 trading days to estimate the normal three-day absolute abnormal returns and an additional period of 200 
trading days for the estimation of the market model used for the calculation of daily abnormal returns. This data 
requirement essentially excludes the site visits that are conducted within one-and-half years from the firm’s IPO.  
13 Our results are similar after we further delete those site visits around other potential confounding events, such as 
dividend announcements and the announcements of seasoned equity offerings.   
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4. Market reactions around site visits 
In this section, we examine market reactions around site visits, based on absolute abnormal 
stock returns. We first present the univariate analysis for the full sample and sub-samples 
partitioned based on the characteristics of site visits and firms’ information environment. We 
then conduct multivariate analysis to ensure the robustness of the results from the univariate 
analysis. Lastly, we use abnormal trading volume as an alternative measure of the market 
reaction and investigate whether the results are similar to those based on stock returns.   
4.1 Univariate analysis  
4.1.1 Univariate analysis for the full sample  
Following prior studies (Cready and Hurtt 2002; Bushee et al. 2011b, 2012), we measure 
the market reaction to site visits using the standardized absolute value of abnormal returns 
(ABN_ABSAR) in the three-day window around site visits.14 Specifically, it is calculated as the 
difference between the three-day absolute abnormal return around the event and the mean value 
of the three-day absolute abnormal returns in the normal period, [-220, -11] (i.e., the mean over 
70 three-day windows in the normal period), divided by the standard deviation of the three-day 
absolute abnormal returns in the normal period:15 
                                                 
14 There are two minor differences between Cready and Hurtt’s (2002) method and our approach. First, we use [-
220, -11] as our normal period while Cready and Hurtt (2002) uses a shorter normal period, [-105, -6]. We move 
backward the normal period for 5 more days because we want to examine the market reactions for seven three-day 
windows around the site visits, [-10, +10], while Cready and Hurtt (2002) investigate seven daily abnormal returns 
around information events. Specifically, we calculate ABN_ABSAR for three-day intervals starting from 10 days 
before the actual site visit dates, and examine whether there is a significant spike in ABN_ABSAR during the [-1, +1] 
window. The inferences are similar if we use daily abnormal returns. Second, we use market-model adjusted returns 
while Cready and Hurtt (2002) use size-adjusted returns. As such, we need an estimation period to estimate the 
market model. Unlike in the U.S., there are no widely accepted size benchmark groups to calculate size-adjusted 
returns in the China market. 
15 As the China stock market has a high level of industry synchronicity (Gul et al. 2010; Morck et al. 2000), we 
conduct a sensitivity test based on sector-adjusted returns. Using the CSRC industry classification (Jian and Wong 
2010), we calculate two types of sector-adjusted returns: value weighted sector-adjusted returns based on 
CSRC_level 1 industry classification and value weighted sector-adjusted returns based on CSRC_level 2 industry 
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ܣܤܰ_ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,[ିଵ,ାଵ] 		=
ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,[ିଵ,ାଵ] 	− ܯܧܣܰ_	ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,௦
ܵܶܦ_	ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,௦  
Where:  
ABSARi,(-1,+1) = |ARi,(-1,+1)|. ARi, (-1,+1) is the accumulated abnormal daily 
returns over the three-day window [-1,+1] centered on the site 
visit event date for firm i. Abnormal daily returns are the 
market-model adjusted returns. The market model for each 
stock is estimated using the trading data of the 200 trading 
days before the normal period, i.e., [-420, -221];16 
MEAN_ ABSARi,s = The mean value of the three-day absolute abnormal returns 
over the 70 three-day windows in the normal period, which 
spans a total of 210 days prior to the site visit window; 
STD_ ABSARi,s = The standard deviation of the three-day absolute abnormal 
returns in the normal period. 
 
We use a three-day window because some activities related to site visits, such as the 
reception dinner and team activities, may start the day before and end the day after the official 
site visit date. Investors can gather information during these activities. 
As shown in Table 2, the mean ABN_ABSAR is 0.122, significant at the 0.01 level. The 
standardization procedure, as explained above, can facilitate cross-sectional comparisons, but it 
is difficult to use it to showcase the economic magnitude (Bushee et al. 2012). Therefore, we 
also present the difference in the absolute abnormal returns between the event window and the 
mean value over the normal period, i.e., the numerator in the above formula, ABSARi,[-1,+1] -
MEAN_ ABSARi,s, as the percentage of average ABSAR for the normal period. As shown in Table 
2, the difference represents 7.30% of the mean value over the normal period. To further evaluate 
the economic significance of the market reaction to site visits, in an untabulated test we calculate 
the market reaction for the three-day window around quarterly and annual earnings 
announcements. We find that the average difference in the absolute abnormal returns between 
                                                                                                                                                             
classification. Our inferences remain unchanged for both types of abnormal returns. We do not report the results for 
the sake of space. 
16 When the normal period is used as the estimation period, our conclusions remain unchanged. 
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the earnings announcement window and the normal period is around 19.16% of the mean value 
of the normal period. Hence the market reaction to site visits is more than one-third of that for 
the earnings announcements. 
To shed light on whether the three-day window around the site visits is unique, Figure 1 
depicts the ABN_ABSAR for each of the seven three-day windows around site visits in the period 
of [-10, +10]. The mean value increases from 0.029 for the window [-10, -8] to 0.122 for the 
window [-1, +1] and then decreases to 0.032 for the window [+8, +10]. Figure 1 clearly shows a 
spike for the three-day window around site visit. As a result, in the following analyses, we focus 
on the window [-1, +1]. 
In sum, our results suggest that investors’ corporate site visits are informative events, 
leading to significant changes in stock prices. We next investigate how the market reactions vary 
with the firm’s information environment and the characteristics of site visits and report the 
results for different subsamples in Table 2.  
4.1.2 Firms’ information environment 
 Information economics theory predicts that the effect of an information event is negatively 
associated with the quality of a firm’s information environment (Verrecchia 2001). It thus 
follows that site visits are expected to trigger a stronger market reaction for firms with poor 
information environment due to the lack of alternative information channels and the higher 
marginal effect of new information. Following prior studies, we capture the quality of 
information environment using proxies for information dissemination, corporate reporting, and 
private information acquisition (Bushman et al. 2004). Based on the data availability, we use the 
analyst coverage (AC) to capture the private information acquisition activities and the public 
disclosure quality rated by the SZSE (Disclosure_ratings) to proxy for the corporate reporting 
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quality. First, we partition the sample into two groups based on the median analyst coverage for 
our sample. Because firms followed by more analysts receive more site visits, we have a larger 
number of site visits to the firms with higher analyst coverage than to firms with lower analyst 
coverage (8,927 vs. 3,399), as indicated in Table 2. The mean ABN_ABSAR is 0.175 for the site 
visits to firms with low analyst coverage while it is only 0.102 for the site visits to firms with 
high analyst coverage, representing an increase of 11.40% and 5.71%, respectively, from the 
normal period. The difference between these two groups is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level (t=2.85).  
Second, we partition the sample into two groups based on the ratings of public information 
disclosure quality assessed by the SZSE. Starting from 2001, the SZSE conducts an annual 
evaluation of listing firms’ information disclosure quality.17 As shown in Table 2, there are 1,393 
site visits to firms rated as C or D, representing poor disclosure quality, and 10,933 site visits to 
firms rated as A or B, representing good disclosure quality. The mean ABN_ABSAR is 0.176 for 
the site visits to firms rated as C and D, while it is only 0.115 for the site visits to A or B rated 
firms, representing an increase of 12.34% and 6.67% from the normal period, respectively. The 
difference between these two groups is statistically significant at the 0.10 level (t=1.65). 
Overall, the site visits are associated with stronger market reactions for firms with poor 
information environment than other site visits.  
4.1.3 Characteristics of site visits  
                                                 
17 Each year after the April 30th deadline for annual report filings, the SZSE performs the evaluation of information 
disclosure quality of Shenzhen-listed firms. There are six criteria in the disclosure quality evaluation, including 
credibility, precision, comprehensiveness, timeliness, compliance, and fairness of information disclosure, with clear 
definitions and detailed rules for each of these six criteria. The SZSE assigns each listed firm to one of four classes: 
A, B, C, and D. The SZSE also enumerates all the circumstances under which a firm should receive a “C” or “D” 
rating. The rating of each listed firm is then posted on the SZSE’s official website. The SZSE initiated the 
information disclosure ratings in 2001, and then updated the criteria in 2008 and 2011. All major clauses remain the 
same throughout our sample period. For the most updated guideline on the information disclosure ratings, see: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/chinext/cybdt/39746715.shtml. 
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As for the characteristics of site visits, we first examine whether the market reaction is 
stronger for those site visits involved with more visitors. The advantage of visiting a firm 
together with others is that visitors can obtain more information from observing and participating 
in others’ discussion with the corporate managers. We partition the sample of site visits into 
those involved with only one visitor (i.e., one-on-one visits) and those with multiple visitors 
(group visits). The effect is expected to be more pronounced for group visits. As shown in Table 
2, there are 7,037 one-on-one visits and 5,289 group visits. The standardized absolute abnormal 
stock returns (ABN_ABSAR) have a mean value of 0.155 for group visits but only 0.097 for one-
on-one visits, and the difference is significant at 0.05 level (t=2.53).  
We next investigate the market reaction to site visits conducted by different types of 
visitors in order to shed light on which type of visitors are better at gathering information from 
site visits and incorporate such information into the market. Prior literature suggests that fund 
managers are usually more informed investors and they can also directly trade on the information 
they discover through site visits (Kosowski et al. 2007; Fama and French 2010; Solomon and 
Soltes 2011; Green et al. 2013). Investors who can better process information or better interpret 
information in conjunction with their own prior research should be able to benefit more from the 
corporate site visits, leading to a stronger market reaction. As such, we expect that site visits 
conducted by mutual fund managers are associated with stronger market reactions than other site 
visits (e.g., those conducted by financial analysts, consulting firms, private equity firms, banks, 
and journalists). Note that in China there are very few hedge funds. For this purpose, we classify 
site visits based on the composition of visitors. If mutual fund visitors dominate a site visit (i.e., 
the visitor is a mutual fund manager for one-on-one visits, or the number of mutual fund visitors 
is more than half of the total number of visitors for group visits), this site visit is classified as a 
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fund visit. As shown in Table 2, there are 4,161 fund visits. We find that the average 
ABN_ABSAR is larger for fund visits than that for non-fund visits (0.161 vs. 0.102) with the 
difference being significant at the 0.05 level (t=2.42). 
To further examine what type of information investors obtain through site visits, we 
perform a content analysis of the visit agenda. We compile a list of keywords related to firm 
strategy, financing activities, accounting information, and sales.18 We then code the indicator for 
visit agenda (Firm_specific) as 1 if the description of visiting activities includes any of the 
keywords on our list. We expect that visits with firm-specific topics being discussed are more 
informative than other site visits, which are usually related to the macro economic situation, the 
industry, and the market trend. As shown in Table 2, there are 7,440 visits with firm-specific 
topics being discussed. The mean ABN_ABSAR is 0.144 for the site visits involving firm-specific 
topics while it is only 0.088 for other site visits, and the difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (t=2.41). 
In sum, we find the market reaction is stronger for group visits, for visits by mutual fund 
managers, and for visits involving firm-specific topics, suggesting that investors gather more 
information during such visits than in other visits.  
4.2 Multivariate analysis of the market reaction 
Table 3 presents the regression results of ABN_ABSAR on the proxies for firm information 
environment and site visit characteristics, after controlling for other potential determinants. Panel 
A of Appendix B presents variable definition, and Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics. We also control for industry fixed effects in the regressions. All t-statistics are 
                                                 
18 Words related to firm strategy includes: strategy, development, prospect, vision, positioning; words related to 
financing include: seasoned offering, bond issuance, bank loan, convertible debt, private issuance, dividend; words 
related to accounting include; performance, gross margin, disclosure, forecast, quarterly disclosure, annual 
disclosure; words related to sales include: price, sales, order, new product, distribution, marketing, clientele, chain, 
store.  
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calculated based on the standard errors adjusted for firm clustering.  
In Panel B of Table 3, we first report the regression results for the two measures of firm 
information environment, including analyst coverage (AC) and the rating of disclosure quality 
(Disclosure_rating). As reported in Column (1), ABN_ABSAR is negatively correlated with 
analyst coverage (t=-2.46) and the disclosure rating (Disclosure_rating) (t=-1.68). The control 
variables are generally not correlated with the market reaction to site visits, except for growth 
(Growth), one-year stock performance (ABRET) and the absolute stock price changes in the short 
period prior to site visits (ABSAR_pre_visit). The market reaction is smaller for firms with 
greater sales growth and better stock performance in the prior year, and is greater for firms 
experiencing a larger magnitude of stock price movement in the short window immediately prior 
to the site visits. 
We then examine how the market reaction to site visits varies with the characteristics of 
site visits, including the number of visitors (Num_visitor),19 fund visit indicator (Funds_visitor), 
and the indicator for visit agenda covering firm-specific topics (Firm_specific). As reported in 
Column (2), ABN_ABSAR is positively correlated with the number of visitors (t=1.96), the 
indicator for fund visits (t=1.89), and the indicator for firm-specific topics (t=2.17).  
When both the information environment variables and visitor characteristics variables are 
included in Column (3), all inferences remain the same. Overall, the results from multivariate 
regressions are consistent with those from univariate analyses in that the market reaction to site 
visits is stronger for firms with poor information environment, for site visits conducted by a 
larger group of visitors or by mutual fund managers, and for those site visits with a visit agenda 
covering firm-specific topics.  
                                                 
19 Alternatively, we use an indicator variable for group visits and find that, as in the univariate analysis, group visits 
are associated with a stronger market reaction.  
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4.3 Analysis of abnormal trading volume 
In this section, we examine whether the inferences hold when we use abnormal trading 
volume around the event windows as an alternative measure to capture market reaction. 
Following Cready and Hurtt (2002), we calculate standardized abnormal trading volumes 
(ABN_TURN) as follows:20 
ܣܤܰ_ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,[ିଵ,ାଵ] 		=
ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,[ିଵ,ାଵ] 	− ܯܧܣܰ_	ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௦
ܵܶܦ_	ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௦  
Where:  
TURNi, [-1, +1] = The trading volumes in shares divided by shares outstanding of 
firm i in the three-day window [-1,+1] centered on the site visit 
event day; 
MEAN_TURNi,s = The mean value of three-day trading volumes over the normal 
period. The normal period is [-220, -11], as in the abnormal return 
measurement;
STD_TURNi,s = The standard deviation of three-day trading volumes over the 
normal period. 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results from the trading volume analysis. As reported in 
Column (1), the two information environment variables are all significantly negatively correlated 
with ABN_TURN. The regression results in Column (2) show that both the number of visitors 
(Num_visitor) and the indicator for fund visits (Fund_visitor) are positively correlated with 
ABN_TURN (t=1.76 and 3.22; respectively). Column (3) shows similar findings when all the 
information environment variables and site visit characteristics variables are included, although 
we do not observe a significant correlation between the indicator of firm-specific topics 
(Firm_specific) and ABN_TURN. In general, the results based on trading volumes are similar to 
those based on stock returns in that the market reaction to site visits is stronger for firms with 
                                                 
20 Bushee et al. (2011b) use the difference between three-day trading volume for the event window and the average 
three-day trading volume in the normal period and does not use the standardized trading volume measure. When 
using their measure of abnormal trading volume, we find similar results and all conclusions remain unchanged 
(untabulated).  
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poor information environment and is stronger for site visits conducted by a larger group of 
visitors or by fund managers.  
 
5. Analysis of earnings information from site visits 
In the previous section, we document significant market reactions to site visits. One might 
argue that the documented price changes in the short event window are due to investors’ biased 
behavior or noise trading, not to the information related to firms’ fundamental value. To test the 
validity of this alternative explanation, we examine whether the price changes around site visits 
are correlated with firms’ future performance, or more specifically, firms’ forthcoming earnings 
news.  
We measure the stock returns around site visits by the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) 
in the three-day event window centered on each site visit (i.e., [-1, +1]).21 Specifically, we follow 
the same procedure as the one used for the return-based market reaction measure and calculate 
the model-adjusted daily abnormal returns. We then accumulate the daily abnormal returns over 
the [-1, +1] window centered on the site visit date. The descriptive statistics show that the 
average CAR is 0.005% and is not statistically different from zero, indicating that during site 
visits investors discover both good news and bad news.22  
We use three alternative measures to capture the forthcoming earnings news. The first 
measure (ΔROA1) is the change in ROA from year t-1 to the current year t, where ROA is 
calculated as the earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. The second measure 
(ΔROA2) is also the change in ROA from year t-1 to year t, but ROA is calculated as the 
                                                 
21 As a robustness check, we also examine alternative event windows: [-2, +2], [-3, +3], and [-4, +4]. The results are 
similar (not reported). 
22 This insignificant stock return to site visits is comforting in the sense that one cannot benefit from knowing that 
others are conducting site visits to a firm. Investors can only benefit from the information obtained from site visits, 
not the knowledge of the occurrence of site visits.   
23 
 
operating income divided by total assets. The third measure is the earnings surprise for the 
current year (UE), defined as the difference between actual EPS for the current year and 
analysts’ consensus EPS forecast in the six months prior to site visits, divided by stock price at 
the beginning of the current year.23 The mean value of ΔROA1, ΔROA2, and UE is 0.18%, 0.29% 
and -0.97%, respectively (untabulated). 
In the regressions we control for firms’ characteristics, including analyst coverage (AC), 
firm size (Size), firm age (Age), leverage (LEV), sales growth (Growth), risk (Beta), share 
turnover (TURNOVER), book to price ratio (BM) and previous stock performance (ABRET). 
Panel B of Appendix B presents the variable definition. We also include industry fixed effects in 
the regressions and all t-statistics are based on the standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. For all of the three regression specifications, the 
coefficients on the earnings news measures (ΔROA1, ΔROA2, UE) are positive and statistically 
significant (t=3.47, 3.61, and 2.95, respectively). Therefore, these results indicate that the 
documented market reaction to site visit is not driven by investors’ behavior bias; instead 
investors uncover valuable information related to upcoming earnings news through site visits.  
A falsification test  
An alternative explanation for the results reported in Table 5 is that these results reflect a 
mechanical relationship between stock return in any 3-day window and forthcoming earnings 
news. In other words, one might argue that stock returns around any three-day windows prior to 
earnings announcements could be positively correlated with forthcoming earnings news. To 
address this concern, we conduct a falsification test. Specifically, for each site visit, we randomly 
select a three-day window for the same firm-year over the non-event trading days (“pseudo site 
                                                 
23 Results are similar when we calculate the earnings surprise (UE) using the most recent analyst EPS forecast prior 
to the site visit for the current year or when we use analysts’ consensus EPS forecast in the last three months prior to 
the site visit. 
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visits”) and then replicate the analysis. The regression results show that the coefficients on 
earnings surprises are not statistically significant (untabulated). This is not surprising because 
there are many other reasons why stock price moves. Therefore, the results in Table 5 are not 
driven by the possible mechanical relationship between the three-day window stock returns and 
forthcoming earnings news.  
Long window analysis of cumulated abnormal returns 
As an alternative analysis of whether the market reaction in the three-day windows is due 
to investors’ misunderstanding of the information obtained from their site visits, we examine the 
price movement in a period after site visits. If the information investors obtained from site visits 
is noise, we should expect a reversal of stock prices after the short window of site visits. For this 
purpose, we partition the sample into two groups: site visits revealing good news and those 
revealing bad news (i.e., CAR[-1, +1] is positive or negative, respectively). For each group, we 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return over the period starting from the day before the site 
visits until 30 days after, i.e., CAR[-1, +31]. We then develop a measure, FracNews, to capture 
the fraction of total site visit news which is impounded into stock prices within the event window 
of [-1, +1], as in prior studies (Kothari et al. 2009). Specifically, FracNews is defined as the ratio 
of CAR[-1, +1] scaled by CAR[-1, +31]. If FracNews is smaller (larger) than 1, it indicates a 
post-site-visit drift (reversal).   
Based on an untabulated analysis, we find that FracNews for the good news subsample is 
1.03, and an untabulated t-test indicates that CAR[-1, +1] and CAR[-1, +31] are not significantly 
different from each other (t=0.55). That is, good news obtained from site visits is fully and 
efficiently incorporated into the stock prices in the short window around site visits. On the other 
hand, FracNews for the bad news subsample is 0.68, and an untabulated t-test indicates that 
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CAR[-1, +1] and CAR[-1, +31] are significantly different (t=8.00). This finding suggests a drift 
following bad news, likely due to the short-selling constraint in China.  
In summary, we find no evidence of significant price reversal after site visits. This result 
further corroborates the inference that the short-window market reaction is not driven by 
investors’ biased behavior or noise trading.   
 
6. Site visits: Selective access or selective disclosure events?  
Although site visits are typical information acquisition activities and are regarded as 
selective access events, the information role of site visits could result from two possible 
information channels: investors’ information discovery or managers’ selective disclosure during 
site visits. The visited firms usually follow the requirement of Reg. FD and ensure that no 
privileged information is leaked during site visits, as shown in the example presented in 
Appendix A. Nevertheless, in this section we conduct two sets of analyses to investigate whether 
site visits are selective disclosure events. 
6.1 Site visits right before earnings announcement dates  
If site visits are primarily selective disclosure events, they will be more useful when 
managers possess more private information. Specifically, if selective disclosure is the driver of 
the information role of site visits, managers would have more private information to disclose 
when it is close to earnings announcements. Investors’ demand for information and thus the 
likelihood of selective disclosure are also the highest in that period (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 2004). 
It thus follows that the market reaction to site visits right before earnings announcements is 
stronger and the stock returns around these site visits are more closely related to forthcoming 
earnings news. On the other hand, if site visits are on average selective access events, we should 
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not observe any difference between site visits right before earnings announcement and other site 
visits. One might even argue that being concerned with the potential litigation risk of selective 
disclosure, managers are particularly careful not to reveal any information, material or not, 
during site visits before earnings announcements, leading to a lower market reaction to these site 
visits.24   
Table 6 presents the regression results after including the indicator of site visits prior to 
earnings announcements, Pre_EA_visit, which is one for site visits occurring in the 30 days prior 
to quarterly or annual earnings announcements. Around 24.13% of our site visit events occur in 
the month before earnings announcements. Columns (1) and (2) report the market reaction 
analysis. We find that Pre_EA_visit is significantly negatively correlated with market reactions 
measured as ABN_ABSAR (t=-2.68). Pre_EA_visit is also negatively, though insignificantly, 
correlated with market reaction measured as ABN_TURN (t=-0.27). Column (3) reports the 
analysis of earnings information conveyed through site visits. We find that the interaction item, 
Pre_EA_visit × UE, has an insignificant coefficient (t=0.81), implying that the stock returns 
around pre-earnings-announcement site visits are not more relevant to future earnings. In 
summary, these results suggest that site visits are selective access events, not selective disclosure 
events. 
6.2 Deleting “trouble” firms 
It is possible that some of the site visits are still contaminated by selective disclosures. 
Managers of some firms might be particularly prone to selective disclosure, or violation of Reg. 
FD. If this is the case, the results will be less likely subject to the impact of selective disclosure 
                                                 
24 One might argue that top executives engage in selective disclosure in periods other than the month before earnings 
announcement, leading to lower market reaction in the pre-earnings announcement period under the selective 
disclosure story. However, this argument requires a lot of strong assumptions. If top executives are concerned with 
litigation risk, they will not engage in selective disclosure in the post-Reg. FD period in the first place.  
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after these firms are excluded from the sample. Using an ex-post method, we exclude from our 
sample the list of firms that are investigated by regulators for potentially violating disclosure 
rules. Specifically, we identify all firms being investigated by the CSRC or the SZSE as 
disclosed on the CSRC’s and SZSE’s websites. If a firm was investigated by either the CSRC or 
the SZSE in 2009-2011, then this firm is identified as a “trouble” firm and is excluded from our 
sample. Untabulated analyses indicate that all our inferences remain unchanged after excluding 
these “trouble” firms (around 17% of the sample firms and 8% of the sample site visits).  
 
7. Determinants of site visits 
The previous analyses indicate that investors benefit from site visits. It is natural to wonder 
how investors decide which firm to visit. As mentioned in our sample selection procedure, some 
firms do not have any site visit during the whole three-year sample period and some firms have 
more visits than others. In this section, we explore the determinants of the likelihood and 
frequency of investors’ site visits. Since site visits are mainly a form of investors’ active 
information acquisition activities, we conjecture that the likelihood and frequency of site visits 
reflect investors’ cost-benefit analysis. We expect a higher likelihood and frequency of corporate 
site visits when site visits are more beneficial and/or less costly.   
7.1 Determinants of corporate site visits 
We use the following variables to capture the potential benefit of site visits. First, complex 
firms’ information is more difficult to be interpreted by investors (Tasker 1998; Bushee et al. 
2003). When the information complexity increases, firms face the challenge of effectively 
conveying these information cues to investors and investors face the challenge of effectively 
interpreting these information cues. Therefore, we conjecture that corporate site visits are more 
28 
 
important when the information complexity is higher.25 We capture information complexity 
using the logged number of business segments (SEG) and we expect that firms with more 
segments are more likely to have investors’ site visits. Second, site visits enable investors to gain 
insights not only about a firm and its operations, but also about its competitors in the same 
industry and the overall industry. As a result, we expect that investors are more likely to visit the 
leading firms in the industry. We use the market share (MSHARE) and size (Size) to gauge a 
specific firm’s relative importance in its industry. Third, we expect that the information acquired 
in the site visit is more beneficial to visitors if the firm is attractive to most investors in the 
market. Prior studies suggest that investors lose interests in firms with poor performance. For 
example, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) find that financial analysts tend to drop their coverage 
on firms with poor performance. In addition, analyst coverage reflects a firm’s attractiveness to 
investors. As such, we use an indicator for profitable firms (Profit) and analyst coverage (AC) to 
capture a firm’s attractiveness to investors. We expected a higher likelihood of corporate site 
visits for profitable firms and for the firms with high analyst coverage.  
On the cost side, we expect that the further the geographic distance between institutional 
investors and firm headquarters, the more time-consuming and the more expensive these site 
visits are. Thus, we expect a lower level of likelihood and frequency of site visits for remote 
firms. We calculate firm’s distance to investors (Distance) as the (logged) mean distance 
between firm headquarters and the three economic centers in China (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen). The variable, Distance, is expected to be negatively correlated with the likelihood 
and frequency of site visits.26  
                                                 
25 Our conjecture is consistent with the finding in Elliott et al. (2012) that restatements announced via video have a 
stronger effect on investors’ judgment and decision making than restatements announced via text. 
26 It is possible that the geographic distance is correlated with the level of economy development. To alleviate this 
concern, in an untabulated additional analysis we control for the economy development levels by including the 
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Following prior studies (Bushee et al. 2012; Soltes 2012; Soloman and Soltes 2011), we 
control for other firm characteristics related to the likelihood of selective access events: firm age 
(Age), stock performance (BHAR), Book-to-market ratio (BM), and firm risk (LEV). Considering 
that China economy has strong government intervention, investors might gain insights into 
government regulations or policy changes by visiting state-owned enterprises. We use the 
indicator of state-owned enterprises (SOE) to capture the possible investor preference for state-
owned companies.27 All variable are defined in Panel C of Appendix B. 
7.2 Empirical results 
The sample for the determinant analysis consists of all firms listed on the SZSE during 
2009-2011. Panel A of Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the 
determinant analysis. Among the 1,963 firm-years with required data for the determinant model, 
58.3% of them have at least one corporate site visit as shown by the mean of the indicator 
variable, D_visit, which equals 1 if a firm receives at least one site visit in year t and 0 otherwise. 
The frequency of site visits has a mean (median) of 6.32 (2.00).  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results for regressions that examine the determinants of the 
likelihood (D_visit) of investors’ corporate site visits in Column (1). Consistent with our 
expectation, we find that investors are more likely to visit firms with a higher level of expected 
benefits. Specifically, we find a higher likelihood of site visits for firms with more business 
segments, firms with a higher market share, larger firms, and firms with higher analyst coverage, 
and a higher likelihood for profitable firms.28 The results are also consistent with investors being 
                                                                                                                                                             
provincial development index and an indicator for firms headquartered in rural areas in the regressions. The 
additional control variables are not significantly correlated with the likelihood or the frequency of site visits.  
27 Bushee et al. (2003) argues that firms with higher level of intangibility (RD/Sales) are more likely to engage in 
selective disclosure in the form of closed conference calls. In an untabulated analysis, we find that RD/Sales is not 
significantly correlated with the likelihood or the frequency of site visits. 
28 Recall that the market reaction to site visits is weaker for firms with higher analyst coverage (Table 3). This result 
is not inconsistent with the finding in Table 7 that investors are more likely to visit firms with higher analyst 
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unwilling to visit companies with a higher cost of visits; the coefficient on Distance variable is 
significantly negative. Note that the effects of these variables are also economically significant. 
The marginal effect of these variables ranges from 5.95% to 19.68%.  
Column (2) of Panel B reports regressions using the frequency of site visits (Freq_visit). 
Freq_visit is a continuous variable which is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
site visits for a firm in year t. The inferences are the same.  
In terms of control variables, we find a higher likelihood and frequency of site visits for 
older firms, for firms with a larger book-to-market ratio, and for visits to state-owned-enterprises.  
Overall, these results indicate that investors’ corporate site visit decision reflects the trade-
off between the costs and benefits of site visits.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Corporate site visits offer investors a unique window into a firm’s operations and are 
important information acquisition activities. Using a unique dataset of site visits from China, we 
find that site visits are associated with economically significant market reactions. We further 
document that the market reactions is stronger for firms with poorer information environment, 
for site visits conducted by a larger group of visitors, for visits by fund managers, and for site 
visits covering firm-specific topics.  
The market reaction to site visits is not due to noises or behavior bias. We find that the 
abnormal stock returns around site visits are positively correlated with firms’ forthcoming 
earnings news. This positive correlation indicates that investors acquire new information about 
forthcoming earnings news through their site visits.  
                                                                                                                                                             
coverage. Specifically, the results in Table 7 suggest a greater aggregate benefit of visiting firms with higher analyst 
coverage. Given that these firms attract a lot more site visits, the individual site visits might not be able to trigger a 
larger market reaction than the site visits to firms covered by fewer analysts. 
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In addition, we find that site visits conducted prior to earnings announcements are not 
associated with stronger market reactions and that the stock returns around these site visits do not 
have a stronger correlation with forthcoming earnings news than site visits conducted in other 
periods. These findings indicate that site visits are not selective disclosure events, which would 
predict that site visits convey more information when managers possess more private information 
in the pre-announcement periods. Also the results are similar after we exclude firms that are 
more likely to have disclosure related issues. 
Lastly we explore the determinants of site visits. We find that the likelihood and frequency 
of investors’ site visits are greater for firms with more business segments, for firms with a higher 
market share, for larger firms, and for firms with positive earnings in the prior year, and for firms 
with higher analyst coverage. In addition, the likelihood and frequency of investors’ site visits 
are negatively associated with the cost to conduct site visits, proxied for by firm’s geographic 
distance from the economic centers. These results suggest that investors’ cost-benefit trade-offs 
play a key determinant role in their decisions of conducting site visits.  
Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first systematic, large-
sample, analysis of the information content and the determinants of site visits, an important form 
of selective access events. Future research can extend this study by examining other important 
issues, such as the exact mechanism of price discovery – how the information obtained by 
visitors is incorporated into the market.  
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APPENDIX A 
A site visit example: Extract of the 2011 annual report of Shenzhen MTC Co., Ltd. 
 
Details of site visits are as follows during the reporting period: 
 
Time Place Visitor Content of discussion and materials provided 
11 May 2011 Headquarters, 
Fuyong 
Factory 
 China Shipbuilding 
Financial Company, HuaTai
United Securities 
Recent production and operation of the Company, 
product management and process management, the 
perspectives of LED. 
 4 Jul. 2011 Grand Hyatt, 
Shenzhen 
China Asset Management, 
Hongyuan Securities, 
Shanghai Zexi Investment 
Management, Harfor Fund 
Management 
 Brief introduction of the company, its products and 
product lines, its business model, its core 
competitive advantage, its LED business 
development strategy, its investment philosophy, and 
its future development strategy. 
18 Aug. 2011 Headquarters E Fund Management    Brief introduction of the company, its products and 
product lines, its business model, its core 
competitive advantage, its LED business 
development strategy. General trends of OEM in 
LCD TV business, the perspectives of the export 
business in the latter half of this year. 
31 Aug. 2011 Headquarters, 
Fuyong 
Factory, 
Shajing 
Factory 
Zhongshan Securities, 
Rongtong Fund 
Management 
 Brief introduction of the company, its core 
competitive advantage, and its future development 
strategy. The sales of LED, General trends of OEM 
in LCD TV business, the major competitive 
advantages of the Company compared to its 
competitors in Taiwan, perspectives of the export 
business in the latter half of this year. 
13 Sep. 2011 Headquarters CITIC Securities  The general situation of the export business of high 
definition digital receiver and LCD TV, the general 
situation of overseas market, the present 
development status of LED and LED packaging, the 
future development strategy of the Company. 
 1 Dec. 2011 Headquarters Zhongshan Securities, 
Hangzhou Yinhe 
Management 
The production and operation of the first three 
quarters of the Company. The business model and 
the supply chain management of the Company, the 
general trends in the industry. 
 8 Dec. 2011  Fuyong 
Factory, 
Shajing 
Factory, 
Zhaochi 
Industrial Park 
Shanghai Securities News, 
Securities Times, Securities 
Daily, China Securities 
Journal, Lion Fund 
Management, Goldstate 
Securities, GF Securities, 
Shenzhen Wansheng 
Investment Management 
Brief introduction of the company, its products and 
product lines, its business model, its core 
competitive advantage, its sales in the first three 
quarters, its LED business development status, its 
investment philosophy, and the development plan 
and the size of Zhao Chi Industrial Park. 
 28 Dec. 2011  Fuyong 
Factory, 
Shajing 
Factory, 
Zhaochi 
Industrial Park 
China Securities Journal, 
Guosen Securities, China 
Merchants Securities, Huaxi 
Securities, Hwabao 
Securities, Great Wall 
Securities 
 Brief introduction of the company, its products and 
product lines, its business model, its core 
competitive advantage, its sales in the first three 
quarters, its LED business development status, its 
investment philosophy, and the development plan 
and the size of Zhao Chi Industrial Park. 
 
In the reporting period, the Company respectively received site visits from investors and analysts for eight times. 
During these site visits, the Company has strictly followed the regulations of Guidelines of Fair Information 
Disclosure for Companies Listed on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board of the Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange, Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for Standardized Operation of Companies Listed on the 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board, as well as the internal guidelines of information disclosure and investor 
relationship management of the Company. The Company fairly treats each investor during the site visit process. 
Investors have to register with the Company before their site visits; investors are strongly suggested to avoid those 
dates that coincide with other significant information disclosure time windows when scheduling site visits. Before 
site visits, all visitors are required to sign an agreement to follow the Company’s site visit policy, and during the site 
visits, visitors are accompanied by more than two staff members of the Company, who shall record the conversation 
and report it to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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APPENDIX B 
Variable definitions  
 
Panel A: Variable definitions for the market reaction analysis 
Dependent Variables 
ABN_ABSAR = The difference between the absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate abnormal 
return in event period and the mean of absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate 
abnormal return in estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of the 
mean absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate abnormal return. 
ABN_TURN = The abnormal share turnover as the 3-day volume divided by shares 
outstanding, less the average 3-day turnover in the estimation period, divided 
by the standard deviation of the mean share turnover in the estimation period. 
 
Information Environment Variables  
AC = Analyst coverage, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts in the most recent calendar 
quarter prior to the site visit date. 
Disclosure_rating = The rating of information disclosure quality assigned by the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange to Shenzhen listed companies. Evaluation ratings are 4 when 
companies are rated A, 3 when they are rated B, 2 when they are rated C, and 1 
when they are rated D. 
Pre_EA_visits = An indicator variable of marking the site visits that occur within a one month 
period before quarterly and annual earnings announcement dates. Coded as 1 if 
an earnings announcement (quarterly or annual) is disclosed over day +1 to 
day +30 after the site visit. 
 
Visit Characteristics Variables 
Num_visitor = Natural logarithm of the number of visitors of a site visit. 
Fund_visitor = An indicator variable of fund visits. Coded as 1 if the number of funds 
accounts for more than 50% of the total number of visitors to a site visit, 0 
otherwise. 
Firm_specific = An indicator variable of content analysis of site visit agenda. Coded as 1 if 
firm specific strategy, finance, accounting, or sales related topics are discussed 
over the site visits, 0 otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
Size = Residual value of market value of equity of firm i in year t-1. We extract the 
residuals from a model of firm size on analyst following, standard deviation of 
stock return, book-to-market ratio, market share, institutional ownership. 
Growth = Sales growth at FYE prior to the site visit. Calculated as the ratio of total sales 
of prior year divided by total sales of year t-2.  
ABRET = The buy and hold market adjusted returns over the year prior to the site visit 
until 30 days before the site visit. 
ABSAR_pre_visit = The absolute value of buy and hold market adjusted returns over one month 
prior to the site visit until 11 days before the site visit. 
TURNOVER = The average monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by shares 
outstanding, for the year prior to the site visit until 30 days before the site visit. 
BM = The book-to-market ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the site visit. 
ΔNI = The change in net income, deflated by total assets at the end of year t-2. 
LEV = The leverage ratio at FYE prior to the site visit, which is defined as the ratio of 
total debt divided by total assets. 
Beta = Stock beta (systematic risk), calculated over the period of day -420 to day -221 
prior to the site visit. 
Age = Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years 
the company has been listed. 
38 
 
 
APPENDIX B (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Variable definitions for the informativeness analysis 
 
Dependent Variables 
CAR = 
 
The cumulated model-adjusted abnormal returns in the three-day event 
window centered on site visits (i.e., [-1, +1]) 
   
Earnings News Variables 
ΔROA1 = The change of ROA, in which ROA equals to earnings before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
ΔROA2 = The change of ROA, in which ROA equals to operating income divided by 
total assets. 
UE = Unexpected earnings, measured as the difference between actual earnings 
per share minus the consensus forecast of earnings per share based on the 
analyst forecasts in the last 6 months prior to site visits, divided by stock 
price at the beginning of the year. 
 
Information Environment Variables  
AC = Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts in the most recent calendar quarter prior to the site visit date. 
   
Control Variables 
Size = Residual value of market value of equity of firm i in year t-1. We extract 
the residuals from a model of firm size on analyst following, standard 
deviation of stock return, book-to-market ratio, market share, institutional 
ownership. 
Growth = Sales growth at FYE prior to the site visit, calculated as the ratio of total 
sales of prior year divided by total sales of year t-2. 
ABRET = The buy and hold market adjusted returns over the year prior to the site 
visit until 30 days before the site visit. 
ABSAR_pre_visit = The absolute value of buy and hold market adjusted returns over one 
month prior to the site visit until 11 days before the site visit. 
TURNOVER = The average monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by 
shares outstanding, for the year prior to the site visit until 30 days before 
the site visit. 
BM = The book-to-market ratio at FYE prior to the site visit. 
LEV = The leverage ratio at FYE prior to the site visit, which is defined as the 
ratio of total debt divided by total assets. 
Beta = Stock beta (systematic risk), calculated over the period of day -420 to day 
-221 prior to the site visit. 
Age = Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
years the company has been listed. 
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APPENDIX B (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Variable definitions for determinant model 
 
Dependent Variables 
D_visiti,t = An indicator variable of site visit, coded as 1 if firm i receives at least 
one site visit in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Freq_visiti,t = Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of site visits for firm i in 
year t.  
   
Variables capturing the benefit of site visits  
SEGi,t-1 = Natural logarithm of total number of business segments of firm i in year 
t-1. 
MSHAREi,t-1 = Sales of firm i divided by the sum of sales of all listed firms that belong 
to the same first 2-digit CSRC industrial code in year t-1. 
Sizei,t-1 = Residual value of of market value of equity of firm i in year t-1. We 
extract the residuals from a model of firm size on analyst following, 
standard deviation of stock return, book-to-market ratio, market share, 
institutional ownership. 
Profiti,t-1 = An indicator variable for profitable firms. It is coded as 1 if firm i has an 
operating gain in year t-1. 
ACi,t-1 = Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of analysts that cover firm 
i in year t-1. 
 
Variables capturing the cost of site visits 
Distancei = Natural logarithm of one plus the mean distance (in the units of 100km) 
between firm i’s headquarters and the three economic centers in China. 
These three economic centers are Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, 
which are identified based on the total number of analysts registered 
within each city.  
 
Control Variables 
Agei,t-1 = Firm age at year t-1, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of years since firm i obtained listing status. 
BHARi,t-1 = The buy and hold market adjusted returns of firm i in year t-1. 
BM i,t-1 = The book-to-market ratio of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
LEVi,t-1 = The leverage ratio of firm i in year t-1, which is defined as the ratio of 
total debt divided by total assets. 
SOEi,t-1 = An indicator variable of firms’ ownership type in year t-1. It is coded as 1 
if firm i is state-owned and 0 otherwise. 
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FIGURE 1  
Abnormal Absolute Model-adjusted Returns around Site Visits 
 
 
 
This figure depicts the trend of ABN_ABSAR during the period of [-10, +10] around the corporate site visits. The 
mean ABN_ABSAR for each three-day window is presented. ABN_ABSAR is calculated as the difference between the 
absolute three-day accumulated abnormal return around the event and the mean value of absolute three-day 
accumulated abnormal returns in the normal period, [-220, -11]. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection and distribution of site visits 
 
This table reports the sample selection and the sample distribution. Panel A presents the sample selection for our 
sample of 12,326 site visit events and 1,190 firm-years from Shenzhen-listed firms in the period 2009-2011. Panel B 
reports the distribution of site visits by calendar year and calendar month. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
 # events of site visits # firms # firm-years 
All site visits 16,616 806 1,595 
 
After deleting site visits without specific event dates 16,576 791 1,556 
 
After deleting site visits without data for the estimation of 
abnormal stock returns and those site visits to firms in the 
financial industries  
12,718 615 1,235 
 
After deleting site visits with missing control variables in the 
multivariate regressions of market reaction and those site 
visits coinciding with earnings announcements 
12,326 579 1,186 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by calendar year and month 
 
Month 
Total  2009 2010 2011 
# of visits % of total visits  # of visits
% of total 
visits # of visits
% of total 
visits # of visits 
% of total 
visits 
 
1 736 5.97%  96 2.85% 363 8.21% 277 6.11%
2 673 5.46%  304 9.02% 148 3.35% 221 4.87%
3 1,214 9.85%  311 9.23% 535 12.11% 368 8.11%
4 992 8.05%  261 7.74% 400 9.05% 331 7.30%
5 1,320 10.71%  330 9.79% 421 9.53% 569 12.54%
6 1,025 8.32%  268 7.95% 319 7.22% 438 9.65%
7 978 7.93%  303 8.99% 351 7.94% 324 7.14%
8 977 7.93%  271 8.04% 317 7.17% 389 8.57%
9 1,181 9.58%  287 8.52% 415 9.39% 479 10.56%
10 672 5.45%  222 6.59% 256 5.79% 194 4.28%
11 1,422 11.54%  406 12.05% 496 11.22% 520 11.46%
12 1,136 9.22%  311 9.23% 398 9.01% 427 9.41%
Total 12,326 100.00%  3,370 27.34% 4,419 35.85% 4,537 36.81%
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TABLE 2 
Univariate analysis of the information content of investors’ site visits 
 
This table reports the standardized absolute abnormal returns (ABN_ABSAR) in the 3-day event windows around site 
visits, as well as proportional and annualized raw difference in absolute abnormal returns (ABSAR) between the 
event window and the normal period.  
 
Panel A reports the full sample univariate results, which includes 12,326site visit events from 579 Shenzhen-listed 
firms in the period 2009-2011. Panel B reports the univariate analysis of sub-samples based on several sample 
partition criteria, including the number of analysts following for the firm being visited (AC), the disclosure ratings 
assigned by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Disclosure rating), the number of visitors on each site visit day (Number 
of visitors), the type of visitors (Visitor type), the specific topics being discussed during site visits (Visit agenda). 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-
sided tests. 
 
Partition 
criteria Samples Obs. 
ABN_ABSARi,(-1,1)  
Difference in absolute abnormal 
returns (ABSAR) 
between the event window and 
the normal period 
  Mean T-value  [as % of normal period ABSAR] 
       
Full Sample  12,326 0.122*** 10.68  7.30% 
       
Analyst 
coverage 
Low coverage 3,399 0.175*** 7.96  11.40% 
High coverage 8,927 0.102*** 7.62  5.71% 
Low – High   0.073*** 2.85   
       
Disclosure 
rating 
Rating = C or D 1,393 0.176*** 5.13  12.34% 
Rating = A or B 10,933 0.115*** 9.51  6.67% 
 C or D – A or B   0.061* 1.65   
       
Number of 
visitors 
Group 5,289 0.155*** 8.83  9.93% 
One-on-one 7,037 0.097*** 6.46  5.35% 
 Group – One-on-one   0.058** 2.53   
       
Visitor type 
Funds 4,161 0.161*** 8.02  10.49% 
Non-Funds 8,165 0.102*** 7.36  5.69% 
 Funds – Non-Funds   0.059** 2.42   
       
Visit agenda 
Firm-specific 7,440 0.144*** 9.55  8.70% 
Others 4,886 0.088*** 5.08  4.93% 
Firm-specific  – Others   0.056** 2.41   
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TABLE 3  
Regression of the market reaction to site visits on visit characteristics and information 
environment variables 
 
This table presents the regression result of the market reaction to site visits on information environment variables, 
visit characteristics, and control variables. 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. Please see Panel A of Appendix B for variable definition. 
 
Panel B presents the regression result of the market reaction to site visits on visit characteristics based on the 
following regression model: 
  
ܣܤܰ_ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܰݑ݉_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ + 	ߚଶܨݑ݊݀_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ +	ߚଷܨ݅ݎ݉_ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ௜,௧ + ߚସܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁_ݎܽݐ݅݊݃௜,௧
+	ߚହܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ +	ߛଵܵ݅ݖ ௜݁,௧ିଵ + ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ + ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଽܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The dependent variable is standardized absolute abnormal returns (ABN_ABSAR). The full sample consists of 12,326 
site visit events with data on required variables in the period 2009-2011. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
ABN_ABSAR 12,326 0.1220 1.2677 -0.7107 -0.2259 0.5414 
AC 12,326 1.7702 0.8890 1.0986 1.7918 2.4849 
Disclosure_rating 12,326 3.0920 0.6340 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
Num_visitor 12,326 0.4365 0.1962 0.3010 0.3010 0.4771 
Fund_visitor 12,326 0.3376 0.4729 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Visit_agenda 12,326 0.6036 0.4892 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Size 12,326 22.6178 1.0203 21.8830 22.5138 23.3219 
Growth 12,326 1.2389 0.4118 1.0156 1.1760 1.3752 
ABRET 12,326 0.1407 0.4631 -0.1639 0.0400 0.3419 
ABRET_pre_visit 12,326 0.0806 0.0704 0.0280 0.0618 0.1128 
TURNOVER 12,326 0.3106 0.1991 0.1553 0.2662 0.4216 
BM 12,326 0.3619 0.2757 0.1713 0.2662 0.4636 
ΔNI 12,326 0.0158 0.0528 -0.0072 0.0099 0.0337 
Lev 12,326 0.4972 0.1917 0.3573 0.5143 0.6452 
Beta 12,326 1.0316 0.1782 0.9376 1.0523 1.1483 
Age 12,326 2.3026 0.5954 2.0794 2.5649 2.7081 
ABN_TURN 12,326 0.1605 1.3678 -0.7968 -0.2197 0.7170 
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Information Environment and site visit characteristics 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
AC -0.0495**  -0.0525*** 
 (-2.46)  (-2.60) 
Disclosure_rating  -0.0967*  -0.1048* 
 (-1.68)  (-1.84) 
Num_visitor  0.1197** 0.1209** 
  (1.96) (1.98) 
Fund_visitor  0.0481* 0.0507** 
   (1.89) (2.00) 
Firm_specific  0.0573** 0.0624** 
  (2.17) (2.38) 
Size -0.0162 -0.0538*** -0.0173 
 (-0.87) (-3.50) (-0.93) 
Growth -0.1007*** -0.1039*** -0.0979*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.08) (-2.94) 
ABRET -0.0886*** -0.0946*** -0.0900*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.14) (-3.01) 
ABSAR_pre_visit 0.4985*** 0.4736*** 0.4755*** 
 (2.92) (2.79) (2.78) 
TURNOVER -0.0898 -0.0684 -0.0903 
 (-1.04) (-0.78) (-1.05) 
BM 0.0456 0.0152 0.0451 
 (0.77) (0.26) (0.77) 
ΔNI -0.0084 0.0402 -0.0094 
 (-0.03) (0.14) (-0.03) 
Lev 0.0158 0.0297 0.0353 
 (0.19) (0.36) (0.43) 
Beta -0.1138 -0.0788 -0.1084 
 (-1.35) (-0.93) (-1.29) 
Age 0.0026 0.0167 0.0012 
 (0.11) (0.70) (0.05) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 12,326 12,326 12,326 
Adj. R2 0.005 0.006 0.007 
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TABLE 4 
Analysis of abnormal trading volume around site visits 
 
This table reports the analysis of standardized abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) in the 3-day event windows 
around site visits based on the following model: 
 
ܣܤܰ_ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܰݑ݉_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ + 	ߚଶܨݑ݊݀_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ +	ߚଷܨ݅ݎ݉_ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ௜,௧ + ߚସܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁_ݎܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
+ 	ߚହܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௜,௧ 	+	ߚ଺ܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ +	ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ
+ ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛଽܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The full sample includes 12,326 site visit events with data on required variables from Shenzhen-listed firms in the 
period 2009-2011. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficient is at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
AC -0.0912***  -0.0947*** 
 (-3.06)  (-3.17) 
Disclosure_rating  -0.2293**  -0.2239* 
 (-2.01)  (-1.94) 
Num_visitor  0.1283* 0.1303* 
  (1.76) (1.79) 
Fund_visitor  0.0905*** 0.0951*** 
   (3.22) (3.38) 
Firm_specific  -0.0246 -0.0141 
  (-0.57) (-0.33) 
Size -0.1956*** -0.2602*** -0.1924*** 
 (-5.10) (-8.01) (-4.98) 
Growth -0.1497** -0.1643** -0.1522** 
 (-2.29) (-2.50) (-2.32) 
ABRET -0.1365*** -0.1499*** -0.1413*** 
 (-2.81) (-3.05) (-2.90)
ABSAR_pre_visit 2.1607*** 2.1307*** 2.1334*** 
 (8.89) (8.81) (8.77) 
TURNOVER -1.2690*** -1.2321*** -1.2729***
 (-8.69) (-8.25) (-8.69) 
BM 0.3913*** 0.3352*** 0.3932*** 
 (3.49) (3.15) (3.51) 
ΔNI -0.7328 -0.6237 -0.7177 
 (-1.35) (-1.19) (-1.33) 
Lev 0.0364 0.0347 0.0436 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) 
Beta 0.3115** 0.3631*** 0.3082** 
 (2.24) (2.61) (2.22) 
Age 0.1466*** 0.1768*** 0.1470*** 
 (2.99) (3.59) (2.96) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 12,326 12,326 12,326 
Adj. R2 0.088 0.086 0.089 
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TABLE 5 
Site visits and forthcoming earnings news  
This table presents the regression result of abnormal returns (AR) on forthcoming earnings news: 
ܥܣܴ௜,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܰ݁ݓݏ௜,௧ +	ߚଶܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ +	ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ
+ ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛଽܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
CAR is calculated as cumulated abnormal returns in the three-day event window centered on site visits (i.e., [-1, 
+1]). Columns (1), (2), and (3) reports the regression results when the forthcoming earnings news is proxied by the 
change in the earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets (ΔROA1), the change in the operating 
income divided by total assets (ΔROA2), and the difference between actual earnings before extraordinary items in 
current year and analysts’ consensus forecast in the 6 months prior to site visits, divided by total market value at the 
end of last year (UE), respectively. The full sample consists of 10,532 site visit events with data on required 
variables from Shenzhen-listed firms in the period 2009-2011. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Panel B of Appendix B for variable definition. 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
ΔROA1 0.0607***     
 (3.47)     
ΔROA2   0.0543***   
   (3.61)   
UE     0.0319*** 
     (2.95) 
AC 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 
 (3.19) (3.14) (2.89) 
Size -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** 
 (-3.94) (-3.98) (-3.96)
Growth -0.0052*** -0.0050*** -0.0059*** 
 (-4.11) (-3.87) (-4.63) 
ABRET 0.0011 0.0009 0.0015
 (0.88) (0.77) (1.20) 
ABSAR_pre_visit -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0043 
 (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.60)
TURNOVER 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.47) 
BM 0.0056*** 0.0055*** 0.0070*** 
 (3.15) (3.07) (3.52) 
Lev -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0005 
 (-0.64) (-0.58) (-0.17) 
Beta 0.0007 0.0004 0.0010 
 (0.22) (0.11) (0.32) 
Age 0.0018* 0.0018* 0.0017* 
 (1.86) (1.85) (1.73) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 10,532 10,532 10,532 
Adj. R2 0.011 0.011 0.010 
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TABLE 6 
Site visits occurring before earnings announcements  
 
This table presents the regression results of market reaction (ABN_ABSAR and ABN_TURN) and cumulated 
abnormal returns (CAR) after including an indicator variable for site visits that occur in the 30 days prior to earnings 
announcement (Pre_EA_visit). 
 
Columns (1) reports the regression results of return based market reaction (ABN_ABSAR). ABN_ABSAR is calculated 
as the difference between the absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate abnormal return in event period and the mean 
of absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate abnormal return in estimation period, divided by the standard deviation 
of the mean absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulate abnormal return. 
 
ܣܤܰ_ܣܤܵܣܴ௜,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܲݎ݁_ܧܣ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ + ߚଶܰݑ݉_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ + 	ߚଷܨݑ݊݀_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ +	ߚସܨ݅ݎ݉_ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ௜,௧
+ ߚହܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁_ݎܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ +	ߚ଺ܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௜,௧ 	+ 	ߚ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଼ܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ 	+		ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ + ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଽܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Columns (2) reports the regression results of volume based market reaction (ABN_TURN). ABN_TURN is calculated 
as the abnormal share turnover as the 3-day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average 3-day turnover 
in the estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of the mean share turnover in the estimation period. 
 
ܣܤܰ_ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܲݎ݁_ܧܣ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ + ߚଶܰݑ݉_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ + 	ߚଷܨݑ݊݀_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ݋ݎ௜,௧ +	ߚସܨ݅ݎ݉_ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ௜,௧
+ ߚହܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁_ݎܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ +	ߚ଺ܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௜,௧ 	+ 	ߚ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଼ܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ 	+		ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ + ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛ଻߂ܰܫ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଽܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Columns (3) reports the regression results of signed market returns (CAR) on the indicator for size visits occurring in 
the 30 days prior to earnings announcement dates (Pre_EA_visit), forthcoming earnings news (UE), and the 
interaction term  of UE×Pre_EA_visit. AR is calculated as abnormal returns in the three-day event window centered 
on site visits (i.e., [-1, +1]).  
 
ܥܣܴ௜,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܲݎ݁_ܧܣ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ +	ߚଶܷܧ௜,௧ +	ߚଷܲݎ݁_ܧܣ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௜,௧ ∗ ܷܧ௜,௧ + ߚସܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ 	+			ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛଶܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ + ߛସܣܤܴܧܶ_݌ݎ݁_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܷܴܱܸܶܰܧܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߛ଻ܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ଼ܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଽܣ݃݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The full sample consists of 12,357 site visit events from Shenzhen-listed firms in the period 2009-2011, and the 
sample size in each column varies with the data availability of the test variables. The t-values in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Panel A and Panel B of Appendix B for 
variable measurement. 
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d)  
 Column (1) ABN_ABSAR 
Column (2) 
ABN_TURN 
Column (3) 
CAR 
Pre_EA_visit -0.0822*** -0.0104 -0.0019* 
 (-2.68) (-0.27) (-1.74) 
UE     0.0258** 
     (2.10) 
Pre_EA_visit×UE     0.0145 
     (0.81) 
Num_visitor 0.1252** 0.1539**   
 (2.05) (2.26)   
Fund_visitor 0.0518** 0.0583**   
 (2.06) (2.19)   
Firm_specific 0.0599** -0.0098   
 (2.29) (-0.24)   
Disclosure_Ratings -0.1157** -0.1920*   
 (-2.06) (-1.83)   
ΔNI -0.1553 -0.5190  
 (-0.55) (-1.14)  
AC -0.0384* -0.1409*** 0.0024*** 
 (-1.91) (-4.70) (3.10) 
Size -0.0567*** -0.0875** -0.0030*** 
 (-2.67) (-2.33) (-4.16) 
Growth -0.0792** -0.0316 -0.0045*** 
 (-2.17) (-0.48) (-3.63) 
ABRET -0.0845*** -0.2110*** 0.0011 
 (-2.86) (-3.87) (0.98) 
ABSAR_pre_visit 0.4924*** 1.7739*** -0.0064 
 (2.92) (7.18) (-0.88) 
TURNOVER -0.1948** -1.2638*** -0.0020 
 (-2.28) (-8.47) (-0.61) 
BM 0.1906*** -0.0049 0.0089*** 
 (2.80) (-0.05) (3.85) 
Lev 0.0364 0.0149 -0.0009 
 (0.43) (0.11) (-0.32) 
Beta -0.1160 0.3374** 0.0012 
 (-1.42) (2.51) (0.39) 
Age 0.0169 0.0865** 0.0017* 
 (0.69) (1.99) (1.73) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 12,326 12,326 10,532 
Adj. R2 0.011 0.130 0.015 
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TABLE 7  
Determinants of site visits -  
Regression of the likelihood and the frequency of site visits on potential determinants 
 
Panel A of this table presents descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables included in the regression, in the order 
in which they appear. Note that Freq_visit is the raw amount in Panel A and is the natural logarithm of the raw 
amount in Panel B. Please see Panel C of Appendix B for variable definition. 
 
Panel B of this table presents the regression results of the likelihood and the frequency of site visits on potential 
determinants: 
 
ܦ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ = 	ߙ + ߚଵܵܧܩ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܯܵܪܣܴܧ௜,௧ିଵ +	ߚଷܵ݅ݖ ௜݁,௧ିଵ +	ߚସܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚହܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜
+	ߛଵܣ݃݁௜,௧ 	+ ߛଶܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ିଵ 	+ ߛଷܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛସܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܱܵܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
ܨݎ݁ݍ_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐ௜,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܵܧܩ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܯܵܪܣܴܧ௜,௧ିଵ +	ߚଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ +	ߚସܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚହܣܥ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜
+	ߛଵܣ݃݁௜,௧ 	+ ߛଶܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ିଵ 	+ ߛଷܤܯ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛସܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛହܱܵܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The sample includes 1,963 firm-years from Shenzhen-listed firms in the period 2009-2011. Column (1) reports the 
logit regression of the likelihood of site visits on potential determinants, with Z-statistics reported in the parentheses. 
The marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability of firm i having site visits in year j, when there is a 
change of one standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variable (or a change from 0 to 1 for the indicator 
variables), with other explanatory variables taking the value of the sample means. Column (2) reports the OLS 
regression of the frequency of site visits on potential determinants, with t-statistics reported in the parentheses. R2 is 
the Pseudo R2 in Column (1) and Adjusted R2 in Column (2). ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
D_visiti,t 1,963 0.583 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Freq_visiti,t (raw) 1,963 6.324 9.769 0.000 2.000 9.000 
SEGi,t-1 1,963 1.098 0.426 0.693 1.099 1.386 
MSHAREi,t-1 1,963 0.008 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.007 
Sizei,t-1 1,963 0.008 0.658 -0.467 -0.032 0.436 
Profiti,t-1 1,963 0.908 0.289 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ACi,t-1 1,963 1.881 2.186 0.000 1.000 3.000 
Distancei 1,963 1,358 489 1,068 1,247 1,440 
Agei,t-1 1,963 8.266 5.477 2.667 9.667 12.833 
BHARi,t-1 1,963 0.185 0.556 -0.125 0.046 0.353 
BMi,t-1 1,963 0.323 0.225 0.171 0.260 0.411 
Levi,t-1 1,963 0.460 0.212 0.304 0.464 0.618 
SOEi,t-1 1,963 0.501 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Regression analysis 
 Column (1)  Column (2) 
 Indicator Variable  Continuous Variable 
 D_visiti,t Marginal Effects  Freq_visiti,t 
Variables capturing the benefit of site visits (predicted sign: + ) 
SEGi,t-1 0.3832** 0.0907  0.1766** 
 (2.25)   (2.21) 
MSHAREi,t-1 0.2515*** 0.0595  0.1111*** 
 (4.74)   (4.65) 
Sizei,t-1 0.5608*** 0.1327  0.4479*** 
 (5.18)   (9.36) 
Profiti,t-1 0.8318*** 0.1968  0.3602*** 
 (4.26)   (4.60) 
ACi,t-1 0.4106*** 0.0971  0.4332*** 
 (4.10)   (9.66) 
Variables capturing the cost of site visits (predicted sign: − ) 
Distancei -0.6266** -0.1482  -0.3050** 
 (-2.18)   (-2.23) 
Control variables 
Agei,t-1 0.1479*** 0.035  0.0551*** 
 (8.99)   (6.98) 
BHARi,t-1 0.0444 0.0105  0.0680 
 (0.46)   (1.46) 
BMi,t-1 0.4126 0.0976  0.3559*** 
 (1.42)   (2.83) 
Levi,t-1 0.2772 0.0656  0.3013* 
 (0.71)   (1.65) 
SOEi,t-1 0.2882* 0.0682  0.1335* 
 (1.79)   (1.72) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes   Yes 
     
Observations 1,963   1,963 
Pseudo or Adj. R2 0.192   0.277 
  
